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Abstract: Since the beginning of the cholera epidemic in Haiti 5 years ago, the prevalence of 
this deadly water-borne disease has fallen far below the initial rates registered during its explo-
sive outset. However, cholera continues to cause extensive suffering and needless deaths across 
the country, particularly among the poor. The urgent need to eliminate transmission of cholera 
persists: compared to the same period in 2014, the first 4 months of 2015 saw three times the 
number of cholera cases. Drawing upon epidemiology, clinical work (and clinical knowledge), 
policy, ecology, and political economy, and informed by ethnographic data collected in a rural 
area of Haiti called Bocozel, this paper evaluates the progress of the nation’s 10-year Plan 
for the Elimination of Cholera. Bocozel is a rice-producing region where most people live in 
extreme poverty. The irrigation network is decrepit, the land is prone to environmental shocks, 
fertilizer is not affordable, and the government’s capacity to assist farmers is undermined by 
resource constraints. When peasants do have rice to sell, the price of domestically grown rice 
is twice that of US-imported rice. Canal water is not only used to irrigate thousands of acres 
of rice paddies and sustain livestock, but also to bathe, wash, and play, while water from wells, 
hand pumps, and the river is used for drinking, cooking, and bathing. Only one out of the three 
government-sponsored water treatment stations in the research area is still functional and 
utilized by those who can afford it. Latrines are scarce and often shared by up to 30 people; 
open defecation remains common. Structural vulnerabilities cut across all sectors – not just 
water, sanitation, health care, and education, but agriculture, environment, (global and local) 
commerce, transportation, and governance as well. These are among the hidden sicknesses that 
impede Haiti and its partners’ capacity to eliminate cholera.
Keywords: water, sanitation, WASH, oral cholera vaccination, elimination
Introduction
“Many people here died of cholera during the epidemic”, recalled a peasant farmer in 
a remote village in the communal section of Bocozel, Haiti. Bocozel lies in the lower 
Artibonite Valley, where the country’s most significant waterway – the Artibonite 
River – meets the Caribbean Sea. For the 60,000 people, most of whom are peasant rice 
farmers, living in this 180 km2 area just north of the coastal city of Saint Marc, the river 
is the villagers’ main source of water for bathing, washing, cooking, and drinking.
Five years ago, however, thousands began falling ill and hundreds died there as a 
result of water-borne pathogens carried by that very river. “In the blink of an eye, we 
went from a few patients to dozens at a time”, recalls the director of the only  medical 
clinic in Bocozel. In a blink of the proverbial eye, cholera would rage across the 
entire country. Vibrio cholerae, which causes extreme dehydration due to diarrhea 
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and vomiting and is spread by ingesting contaminated food 
or water, had been introduced into a nation already ranking 
among the most insecure in the world in terms of safe water, 
sanitation, and access to food. The estimated death toll as of 
January 10, 2016 is 9,163.1
Efforts to control the cholera epidemic in Haiti have been 
many and range widely in scale, coordination, and impact. 
The Government of Haiti’s National Plan for the Elimination 
of Cholera in Haiti, 2013–2022, launched in February 2013, 
is a comprehensive guide to tackling short- and long-term 
epidemiological, structural, and management issues within 
the water, sanitation, hygiene, and health sectors. As of 
2015, however, only 18% of the plan’s $2.2 billion budget 
had been financed.2 Beyond the dearth of funding, hidden 
and unaddressed structural factors – food insecurity and 
hunger, vagaries of weather and trade – influence not only 
the ecology of disease but also the ultimate success of the 
elimination plan.
We undertook a biosocial study to evaluate progress 
toward the elimination of cholera in Haiti, focusing our efforts 
on one region of rural Haiti that saw some of the first cholera 
cases during the outset of the epidemic in October 2010. From 
June to July 2015, one author (VKK) lived in Bocozel and 
employed participant observation and interview methods to 
collect ethnographic data from peyizan (peasant farmers), 
medical professionals, government officials, and other local 
community members.3 Verbal informed consent was obtained 
from all participants. Two focus groups, ten individual semi-
structured interviews, and dozens of informal conversations 
were conducted, transcribed, and coded. Together with pri-
mary source literature, these data were analyzed thematically 
using medical anthropology approaches and drawing on the 
conceptual rights-based framework advanced by the 2009 
report, Wòch nan Soley: The Denial of the Right to Water in 
Haiti.4 Incorporating these ethnographic data with epidemiol-
ogy, clinical work (and clinical knowledge), understanding of 
policies and the challenges of implementing them, ecology, 
and political economy, we evaluated the progress toward 
eliminating cholera as well as the factors that impede or 
promote realization of this goal. The research was approved 
by the institutional review boards of Partners HealthCare, 
Boston, USA, and Zanmi Lasante, Cange, Haiti.
During a focus group interview with members of the 
local grassroots organization of peyizan rice farmers, 
Oganizasyon d’Ayiti pou Developman (Haitian Organization 
for Development [OAD]), men and women from Bocozel 
often invoked the Haitian proverb, maladi kache pa gen remèd 
(hidden sickness cannot be cured). They meant by this that 
issues left unexposed or unconsidered will fester and subvert 
any efforts toward healing or amelioration. These sicknesses, 
the farmers explained, do not only refer to cases of underlying 
disease, but also evoke unspoken, malignant challenges that 
one faces daily – challenges that, if left unaddressed, threaten 
to undermine progress.
This paper will critically review Haiti’s 10-year National 
Plan for the Elimination of Cholera as well as its measures 
that have been implemented and their successes and short-
falls. We will then situate the plan in the realities faced 
in Bocozel, which will help to elucidate those underlying 
 elements that factor into the feasibility of eradicating 
 cholera from Haiti. As one farmer said, “If you do not 
hide your problems, you can hope that one day they will 
change”.
The national cholera elimination plan
In February 2013, the Government of Haiti’s Ministry of 
Public Health and Population (MSPP) and the National 
Directorate for Potable Water and Sanitation (DINEPA) 
officially launched the National Plan for the Elimination 
of Cholera in Haiti, 2013–2022 in collaboration with the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the US Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC), and the Pan American Health 
Organization, the regional office in the Americas of the 
World Health Organization (WHO-PAHO). This 10-year 
plan targets four major areas for eliminating cholera – 
water and sanitation, health care services and management, 
epidemiology and surveillance, and health and hygiene 
promotion – and comprises three implementation phases.5 
The first 2 years are dedicated to short-term objectives, 
by which annual cholera incidence should fall from 3% to 
less than 0.5%; 5 years are for medium-term objectives, by 
which incidence should be reduced to less than 0.1%; and 5 
years are for long-term goals and having an incidence rate 
of less than 0.01%.
To meet these aims, the elimination plan promotes an 
integrated approach that involves improving access to potable 
water and sanitation facilities, increasing the collection of 
solid waste in metropolitan areas, strengthening the health 
care system, maintaining epidemiological and laboratory 
surveillance and early detection, ensuring rapid response to 
outbreaks, intensifying public health education on hygiene 
and prevention, promoting efforts in researching the social 
impacts of cholera, and decentralizing the sector through the 
development of community-based forms of monitoring and 
implementation. The plan also calls for the coordination of 
domestic and international actors in the water, sanitation, 
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and hygiene (WASH) sector involved in both emergency and 
long-term response efforts.
To accomplish these goals, the Government of Haiti and 
its partners identified $2.2 billion as urgently needed, the 
majority of which would be dedicated to activities in the 
WASH sector, reflecting the massive needs in that area. They 
also recognized that the efforts described above would require 
extensive capacity building within the Haitian government – 
strengthening financial management and human resources 
from national to local level. The successful and lasting reali-
zation of the ultimate aim of the plan – to eliminate cholera 
from Haiti – must overcome long-standing limitations in 
institutional ability to manage investments and sustain WASH 
facilities and programs.5
The plan in action
Immediately following the launch of the National Plan for 
the Elimination of Cholera, MSPP and DINEPA released 
the Short Term Plan, 2013–2015, which outlined in three 
phases – emergency, postemergency, and development – 
a framework for addressing water and sanitation as well as 
public health.6 The prevention activities outlined in this plan 
sought to curb the transmission of cholera from one person 
to another through the use of potable water for consumption, 
hand washing, and proper food handling.
While the framework contains actions for immediate 
response, such as supply distribution and health care pro-
vision for cholera cases, many of its interventions would 
help to lay a foundation for long-term cholera prevention. 
Such measures include improving access to safe and afford-
able water and water treatment products, disseminating 
hygiene and health education, coordinating a local network 
of municipal sanitary technicians and community health 
agents, carrying out a campaign to mandate families to build 
latrines (with technical assistance from the government), 
vaccinating against cholera in high-risk communities, and 
opening wastewater treatment plants. In those first 2 years 
of the plan, gains have been made in each of these areas, in 
part, thanks to initial increased funding from donors across 
the world and coordinated efforts between the Government 
of Haiti, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the 
United Nations (UN).
Recognizing that early detection and treatment of cholera 
are also preventive measures, MSPP, DINEPA, and their 
partners developed an epidemiological surveillance and 
alert system. Using rapid diagnostic cholera tests, national 
epidemiologists and their foreign counterparts attempt to 
distinguish cholera from other pathological acute diarrheas 
and isolate pockets of cholera outbreaks. Coordination among 
WASH and health actors in response to alerts has helped to 
collect epidemiological data from 90% of geographic depart-
ments and communes, although the target, of course, is to 
cover 100% of the country.7
In addition to surveillance and medical treatment, the 
plan’s coalition of partners has implemented cholera preven-
tion policies geared toward health promotion at the local 
level. By 2014, DINEPA had deployed across Haiti 280 
commune-level field agents and 266 communal drinking 
water and sanitation technicians (techniciens eau potable 
et assainissement communaux [TEPACs]) to contribute 
to both cholera case management as well as prevention 
efforts.7 MSPP and other partners also established local 
rapid response mobile teams and mobilized community 
health workers to promote and report on water and sanitation 
in addition to health issues at the geographic departmental 
level. Since 2012, MSPP, PAHO, and others have drawn 
upon this local network to carry out a vaccination campaign 
targeting 375,000 people in 12 communes.8 Last year, the 
Government of Haiti and UNICEF launched the National 
Sanitation Campaign, which deploys low-cost WASH tech-
nologies and uses a strategy similar to the Community-Led 
Total Sanitation approach, but are more specific to Haiti’s 
context, to strive for zero open defecation. The campaign 
targets 55 communes over 5 years with the aim of encour-
aging community-level behavior change and leadership, 
as well as sustained financing strategies and private sector 
participation, such as regarding the supply and demand for 
sanitation products.9
Several major infrastructural projects as well as numer-
ous quick-impact ones have also been undertaken over the 
past 2 years as part of the plan’s measures to improve water 
and sanitation infrastructure: from building latrines in public 
spaces and rehabilitating existing latrine blocks to  providing 
desludging services and establishing small-scale water 
 treatment stations. Measurable outcomes of the lasting effects 
of these projects, however, remain to be assessed. A Cholera 
Short Term (Phase I) Elimination Plan Evaluation Committee, 
led by MSPP’s Unite d’Appui a la Decentralisation Sanitaire, 
accompanied by DINEPA, UNICEF, and WHO-PAHO, is 
currently conducting site visits in majority of the departments 
of Haiti, collecting water, sanitation, hygiene, and health data 
and drafting a report. According to one committee member, 
the report will assess the progress of the elimination plan 
over its first 2 years (comparing the results obtained to the 
plan’s objectives, while recognizing that only a small fraction 
of the required funds has been received). The committee will 
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give recommendations on how to improve the medium- and 
long-term components of the remaining phases of the plan 
through 2022.
Since the launch of the elimination plan, DINEPA and 
its partners have made advances in sanitation capacity. 
By 2012, two massive wastewater treatment centers had 
been  constructed – supported by international donors and 
collaborators – to manage a portion of the sewage from 
Port-au-Prince with the hope of building more than a dozen 
others around the country that would receive human waste 
transported by trucks.10 By August 2015, however, only one 
of those facilities (Morne a Cabrit) outside of the capital 
remained open. At the other site, Titanyen, the gates are 
locked, and the funding necessary for operations is as stagnant 
as the abandoned pools within the facility. The sewage plants 
face challenges in establishing supply chains to channel more 
of the human waste generated in the catchment area toward 
the facilities rather than following the practice of unregulated 
dumping of human waste elsewhere (which continues on a 
large scale), finding a common vision among the partners 
for specific operating decisions, dealing with significant 
amounts of rubbish in latrine matter which clog the ponds, 
generating enough revenue for the plants to remain open, 
and collaborating with local bayakou (men who nocturnally 
empty latrines and septic tanks) and the companies with 
which they work to maintain the bayakou’s economic viability 
while still having them pay a fee to discharge their collected 
waste at the facility.
In a July 2015 update, the UN Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs reported that only 18% of the 
elimination plan’s $2.2 billion budget had been funded, 
sharply limiting its realization.2 The Haitian government 
agencies also have limited staffing resources and management 
capacity, restricting their ability to coordinate the activities 
of the diverse WASH sector. Despite these barriers and there 
have been measurable advancements made by the cholera 
elimination plan across the domains of epidemiologic sur-
veillance, rapid response and outbreak management, hygiene 
promotion and sensitization, medical treatment, water sup-
ply and sanitation, and coordination among government 
entities, particularly MSPP and DINEPA, and international 
organizations.
Each of the target areas mentioned above, however, 
has also faced significant shortfalls. At the local level, for 
example, DINEPA has faced challenges in maintaining the 
continuous employment of TEPACs and DINEPA commune-
level field teams, who have been trained, but whose salaries 
have thus far relied on project-specific funds and, therefore, 
not guaranteed long term. Beyond direct funding deficits for 
the elimination plan, the withdrawal of many implementing 
field partners due to insufficient funds of their own has had 
serious consequences. By 2014, for instance, the number 
of cholera treatment facilities dropped from 250 to 159; 
of the remaining centers providing cholera treatment, only 
60% were found to have adequate water supply and sanita-
tion infrastructure, sanitary practices, and infection control 
measures.7
Within such a context, DINEPA and MSPP have had little 
choice but to focus their efforts in settings where defeating 
cholera is a first priority, as the present funding cannot be 
stretched to cover the comprehensive, nationwide efforts laid 
out in the elimination plan. The poor, and especially those 
 living in rural areas which have historically suffered the great-
est neglect in terms of development, continue to face dispro-
portionate limitations when it comes to accessing health care, 
clean water, and sanitation services (Figures 1 and 2).
In the 5 years since the beginning of Haiti’s cholera 
outbreak, incidence rates have dropped substantially, but 
the number of cases in the first 4 months of 2015 was triple 
to that of the same period in the previous year.11 In 2014, 
27,753 cases of cholera were reported from Haiti, comprising 
almost 15% of the total global burden of reported cases.12 
In the first few weeks of the Haitian epidemic, case fatality 
reached 6.2%, which was likely a substantial underestimate.13 
When launched in 2013, the plan aimed to reduce the global 
fatality rate of cholera to less than 1% by 2015. Global 
fatality currently stands at 1.07%,1 and has not substantially 
16%
6%
29%
22%
27%
Poorest Second quintile Middle Fourth quintile Wealthiest
Figure 1 Percentage of cholera cases in Haiti by socioeconomic quintiles, October 
2010–2012 (N=2,839).
Note: Reproduced from Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population. Enquête 
Mortalité, Morbidité et Utilisation des Services (EMMUS-V): Haiti 2012 [Survey on 
Mortality, Morbidity, and Use of Services: Haiti 2012]. Pêtion-Ville, Haiti: Institut 
Haïtien de l’Enfance; 2013. French. Available from: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/
FR273/FR273.pdf. Accessed September 23, 2015.23
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changed since November 2011, according to PAHO.14 When 
asked about the accomplishments of his regional office, one 
DINEPA official asked, “If something you once called a suc-
cess is now deficient, is it still a success?”
Successes and shortfalls of the plan: 
lessons from Bocozel
Bocozel is a 180 km2 area lying in the fertile floodplain 
between the coastal town of Saint Marc and the Artibonite 
River (Figure 3). Water flowing through the canals crisscross-
ing this expansive territory is used to irrigate  thousands of 
acres of rice paddies and sustain livestock; people also use the 
canals to bathe, wash, and play, while wells, hand pumps, and 
the river are the main sources of water used for drinking, cook-
ing, and bathing. A 2012 study of water quality in Bocozel 
showed that the river, canals, and wells contain highly elevated 
levels of coliform bacteria and Escherichia coli, while most 
borehole pumps showed undetectable levels (though they are 
not easily accessible for all residents).15 Only 48% of families 
in rural areas of Haiti have access to improved drinking water 
(ie, a source protected from contamination with fecal matter) 
– a decline from 50% in 1990.16
“Go get some water”, Veronica said as she dropped a 
couple of empty five-gallon buckets in front of two young 
men sitting below a weathered and knotted tree. The lakou, 
or sizable open yard, was bustling with activity. That night 
they would be celebrating a bal, which is just like what it 
sounds like a ball – a large semiformal dance celebrating 
the memory of the family’s matriarch who had died 2 years 
ago. Her husband’s home had been transformed into a Vodou 
ancestral shrine on the inside, and out in the front a tall poto 
mitan, or center post, had been placed to hold up a gray-
colored USAID tarp. The two young men picked up the 
buckets and shortly later, returned with them full of slightly 
murky water from the Artibonite River, which wound its 
way behind this pocket of homes in the Bocozel locality (or 
neighborhood) of Duclas.
Immediately, one bucket was taken to the back of 
 Veronica’s house and was reserved for hand washing and other 
toilet purposes. The other one was placed by a group of women 
who were busy preparing large amounts of food for the friends, 
family, Vodou musicians, and neighbors soon to arrive. This 
water was used to rinse cooking utensils and vegetables and 
was also boiled to cook rice, plantains, and stew.
If individuals in Bocozel can afford to buy them when 
they are accessible, most will treat the well, pump, or river 
water with purification tablets or drops. In another form of 
treatment, sediment in murky river water can be separated 
out by mixing in the mucilage, or gummy substance, from a 
crushed piece of prickly pear cactus. Scientific research shows 
that these cacti have coagulant properties that can reduce water 
turbidity by 98% and even remove bacteria.17 Without decent 
clean water and sanitation infrastructure, people in Bocozel 
have few other options for meeting their needs.
Meanwhile, the treated water reserved for drinking and 
ceremonial purposes had run out. Guilanda, Veronica’s sister, 
and one of Veronica’s daughters hopped on their bicycles 
with a few empty gallon jugs in hand to purchase water 
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Figure 2 Number of cholera cases in Haiti by area of residence among 2,839 patients, October 2010–2012 (*does not include IDP camps).
Note: Reproduced from Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population. Enquête Mortalité, Morbidité et Utilisation des Services (EMMUS-V): Haiti 2012 [Survey on Mortality, 
Morbidity, and Use of Services: Haiti 2012]. Pêtion-Ville, Haiti: Institut Haïtien de l’Enfance; 2013. French. Available from: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR273/FR273.pdf. 
Accessed September 23, 2015.23
Abbreviation: IDP, internally displaced persons.
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from a treatment station up the road in La Sisyon. Given 
its location near an important crossroad, La Sisyon was 
chosen by DINEPA and its partners, including UNICEF 
and the CDC, as one of the localities in Bocozel that would 
receive a solar-powered water treatment kiosk; a small Water 
Point  Committee made up of community members was 
also  established to monitor it. The La Sisyon water kiosk 
serves three surrounding localities, each with an estimated 
1,500–2,000 inhabitants. It means that this source alone 
provides reliably potable water for 4,500–6,000 people – or 
at least serves those who can afford it or choose to pay for it. 
For less than 5 cents, people can purchase a couple of gallons 
of purified water from the station. This price, however, is sig-
nificant for many Haitian families. An average Haitian family 
of four would have to spend approximately 12% of its annual 
income in order to purchase the World Health Organization’s 
minimum standard of 20 L of water per day.4
Not everyone chooses or has the resources to purchase 
the water, but the facility is changing the landscape in this 
rural area of Haiti. “People usually get water from the canal, 
let it stand, and then drink it”, explained Wilson, a credit 
union manager in Saint Marc and a close friend of Veronica’s 
family. He said, “Even though 100% of the population might 
not take advantage of the treatment stations, you’ll still find 
a significant number of people who have access to it”. The 
La Sisyon water kiosk has, thus far, had a beneficial impact 
on the village and surrounding localities – at least for those 
who are within walking or biking distance and who are able 
to afford the treated water. Also, at the end of summer, talks 
emerged of plans for a new station to be built in Duclas.
Other localities have not had the same success. The water 
treatment station in the central village of Bocozel was looted 
of its solar panels and other useful parts and, as of January 
2016, was in complete disrepair, with cobwebs spun across 
its dust-covered machinery. In June 2013, there was a battle 
between gangs in the neighboring localities of Dubuisson and 
Bwa Deyo. Many houses were burned and three people were 
killed; the water station in Dubuisson, which had been widely 
used, was ransacked; a well, dug years ago by Oxfam in Bwa 
Deyo was also destroyed.18 As a result, 9,000–12,000 people 
no longer have reliable access to safe water from the kiosks 
in Bocozel and Dubuisson, which remain unrepaired.
Caribbean Sea
Atlantic Ocean
Artibonite
river
Saint-Marc
Gonaives
Artibonite river
Bocozel
La Sisyon
Dubison
Duclas
Pont Sondé
Bwa
Deyo
Cap Haitien
Mirebalais
Bocozel
Port-au-Prince
Figure 3 Map of Bocozel, Haiti.
Note: Reproduced from Google Maps. Available from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Haiti_location_map.svg. Accessed September 28, 2015.49
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The rival gangs had targeted water as a way to cut com-
munities off from an essential human need. Their actions, 
however, were enmeshed in an everyday violence fueled 
by ecological and social fragility in the context of resource 
scarcity.19 In other words, the attacks were intimately linked 
and in response to broader forms of violence structured and 
perpetuated over long years and situated in certain systems of 
social and material order.20 These gang members, themselves 
victims of a continuum of structural violence (eg, chronic 
water insecurity), had become the victimizers, and the com-
munity as a whole suffers.21,22
Resource scarcity is not confined to difficulties accessing 
safe drinking water. Latrines in Haiti range from raised cement 
block structures to a mud-and-stick mound built over a deep 
hole, or to no latrine at all, and other iterations in between. 
In Bocozel, household latrines have, in many ways, become 
public facilities. Unless a family keeps it locked, a latrine can 
be used by 20–30 people or more: “Not only the ten or twelve 
people living in a home”, explained a Zanmi Lasante commu-
nity health agent who works in the area, “but people passing 
by will come use it, too”. A farmer in the remote settlement 
of Bwa Deyo painted an even starker picture: 
We have no toilets around here. We maybe have four toilets 
in the area […] but now they are all full. People, especially 
if it’s urgent, go to the bathroom outside in a corner of the 
land.
Peasant farmers in Bwa Deyo explained that open defe-
cation is common in rural Haiti: “People are used to doing 
that here. We’ve been going to the bathroom outside since 
we were children”. In an announcement made last year, the 
UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson lamented the fact 
that a child dies every 2.5 minutes from diseases linked to 
open defecation. “Those are silent deaths – not reported in 
the media, not the subject of public debate. Let’s not remain 
silent any longer”, he said.24 In the context of resource scar-
city, where few latrines or other infrastructure exist, behaviors 
like open defecation easily become the norm. In order to end 
these silent deaths, steps must be taken to address the hid-
den barriers for making improved sanitation (which ensures 
that human excreta are hygienically separated from human 
contact) accessible to all.
According to UNICEF, less than 30% of all Haitians 
have access to improved sanitation; this figure drops to 19% 
in rural areas.16 One of the major roadblocks is that even if 
Haitian law requires it, and even if a family wants it, many 
people in Haiti lack the resources to build a long-lasting 
latrine with proper materials. A formative study conducted 
by a team from Quisqueya University’s Laboratory of Water 
Quality and Environment in Port-au-Prince used field survey 
data collected from 3,000 adults from across the country to 
assess sanitation in Haiti. While 97% of the respondents 
recognized that human waste is a source of disease, almost 
85% cited money as the main reason why they are not able 
to build a toilet in their house.25 Strengthening the sanitation 
systems in Haiti would have gains not only in the realm of 
public health, but economically as well: one study showed 
that US $1 invested in sanitation in the Latin America and 
Caribbean region produced US $7.20 in return, as well as 
direct health care savings and productive days gained.26
The hidden sicknesses behind 
cholera
The plan formulated to end the transmission of cholera in 
Haiti has had some quantifiable impact: government, multi-
lateral, and NGO agencies are able to report on the number of 
latrines built, wells dug, community health workers trained, 
and bars of soap distributed. Case fatality has decreased, and 
vaccination efforts, where they have occurred, have been 
demonstrably successful in reducing caseload.27–30 Overall, 
however, the elimination plan has been mired by limitations. 
We have reviewed how funding and management constraints 
have curtailed much of its scope. But the plan’s most  glaring 
omissions are the lack of built-in measures to eliminate the 
hidden sicknesses that have and will sustain cholera in Haiti, 
unless addressed. These underlying factors contribute to the 
milieu of poverty, which in turn creates a vicious cycle of 
increased burden of disease and suffering, mediated by ele-
ments such as water insecurity, sanitation insecurity, food 
insecurity, structural violence, unsafe housing, and lack of 
access to effective health care. Summarized in Figure 4, some 
of these factors include unaffordable fertilizer, lack of reli-
able electricity, political marginalization, weak institutional 
governance, crumbling infrastructure, the effects of climate, 
and a rice market flooded by foreign imports.
What was evident during conversations with farmers in 
Bocozel was a collective awareness of these  overlapping 
problems, despite a frequent reluctance to voice them 
openly – doing so, people said, can be emotionally draining 
or  embarrassing. No adult, they said, likes to admit that they 
have not eaten more than some crackers or a cup of rice in 
4 days, or that they cannot afford to access clean water, or 
that they do not have enough money to pay for their prescrip-
tions or to build a toilet at their home. It is only by exposing 
those hidden problems, however, that “you can hope that 
one day they will change”. In this section, we will explore 
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several of the hidden sicknesses of cholera, all ultimately 
linked to poverty.
Development efforts in the context of 
extreme poverty
Following the earthquake in January 2010 and the beginning 
of the cholera epidemic in October of same year, hundreds of 
multilateral organizations and NGOs of all sizes poured into 
Haiti. A report by the CDC notes that many of these efforts 
by various organizations focused on disaster response, rather 
than on longer-term development of WASH infrastructure and 
programs.31 Some present efforts, though, are geared toward 
systems-strengthening and community-based accompani-
ment and are contributing to signs of progress.
With financial support from UNICEF and in partnership 
with DINEPA, the Ministry of Finance, MSPP, and others, 
the Ministry of Education is coordinating a Healthy Schools 
Campaign, which aims to improve sanitation and hygiene in 
100 schools. Dr Florence Guillaume, the Minister of Health at 
the time of the development of the plan, recently announced 
the results of a nationwide survey which showed that 25% of 
school children suffer from some form of intestinal parasites.32 
In Haiti, only 26% of schools have access to water;33 79% of 
health facilities have access to an improved water source, and 
less than half have sanitation facilities.34 The campaign, in 
many ways, is correcting for past projects that failed to guar-
antee access to safe water and sanitation in public facilities.
Shortly after the outbreak of cholera began, several inter-
national humanitarian organizations arrived in  Bocozel. One 
group’s efforts focused primarily on emergency response 
and the construction of latrines and what they termed 
hygiene awareness. “From what I know, [that NGO] is not 
around anymore”, said the local health clinic’s medical 
director. He also commented, 
People still use the bathroom everywhere [outside] […] and 
they don’t have the means to wash their hands. Some people, 
because of lack of money, are compelled to not follow the 
principles of hygiene. It’s deadly. 
A peasant farmer and member of the Haitian OAD 
also recalled efforts by outside WASH-promoting orga-
nizations. “We had people who came to teach us [about 
proper hygiene]”, he said, “but we don’t even have toilets 
to use”.
Common throughout two focus groups, ten semistruc-
tured interviews, and dozens of informal conversations was 
the issue of mwayen, or economic means. One middle-aged 
female peasant farmer in OAD explained, “If we have a little 
money left, we can go to the market to buy a few small things 
to eat, or buy a few raw things to try to resell”. Before it was 
destroyed, she had served on the committee responsible for 
the local oversight of the Dubuisson water treatment station. 
“If you don’t have money,” she said, “you will suffer, you 
will struggle to live.”
Lack of
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Figure 4 How poverty may impede the realization of Haiti’s plan to eliminate cholera.
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The members of OAD spoke about having to choose 
between buying food or paying for a child’s education 
because their rice crop had not brought in enough money, 
being ashamed of having to defecate outside because their 
latrine was in disrepair, having to go 4 or 5 days in a week 
without a good meal, being unable to afford the exorbitant 
price of fertilizer, dealing with nonfunctional canals and 
weeks of drought, and being unable to access electricity 
since a transformer blew out a year ago. The rice farmer at 
the beginning of this article mentioned the deadly  hidden 
sickness of infrastructural inadequacy: “One reason [why so 
many people died during the cholera outbreak] was because 
people were drinking untreated water”, he went on.
But there’s also no access to a good road to get to the 
 hospital, so some people died on the way there. […] We 
had to carry people on our backs until we could find trans-
portation to arrive at the clinic. And sometimes as we were 
carrying people out, they died on our backs because we 
didn’t have anything to rehydrate them.
OAD is among those advocating to make the plight of 
the rural Haitian population known to those in power – from 
Haitian government officials and elected representatives to 
leaders and members of NGOs and international funding 
entities. It is also working to help local farmers identify and 
articulate the factors that structure the poverty, vulnerability, 
and violence of their circumstances by creating a space for 
inspection and discussion of these issues. In other words, 
it is working toward unmasking the hidden violence of the 
farmers’ political, economic, and ecological realities. “This 
is what we are trying to do: to train and educate the people”, 
explained Rafael, the OAD Coordinator.
We no longer want to wash our hands and wipe them on the 
ground. It should be an ongoing training to try to help the 
people become aware of their situation. Otherwise, we will 
continue going around the cycle that keeps things worse off 
for the peyizan. [rice farmer]
Challenges of limited institutional 
governance
From farmers in Bocozel to DINEPA officials to the direc-
tor of the government agency dedicated to the development 
of the Artibonite Valley, financial resources were cited as 
the primary barrier to accessing health care, education, 
safe water, a well-constructed toilet, food, fertilizer, seeds, 
equipment, and basically everything else. Poverty is the 
source of much suffering and conflict. “We have lots of 
battles over land”, said Marcel, a Bocozel peasant who 
has been part of the leadership of the government’s local 
chapter of the National Institute of Reform of Agriculture 
of the Artibonite for the past 2 decades. Marcel continued, 
“People are fighting and killing one another; cutting each 
other’s legs and arms. Anpil moun mouri, lots of people 
die” – including in Marcel’s own family (his brother-in-law 
was accused of murdering one of Marcel’s sons using a 
maleficent powder).
As both a farmer and a member of the National Institute 
of Reform of Agriculture of the Artibonite – living down-
stream of and dealing with the internal inadequacies of the 
governance system – Marcel is well placed to recognize 
the consequences of poverty compounded by institutional 
weakness. “The government doesn’t take responsibility. 
The things that cause this fighting and killing over a piece 
of land are the responsibility of the government”. Lack of 
a more responsive system of governance has engendered 
a state of chronic vulnerability to the structural violence 
of poverty.
Conflicts arising from resource constraints and inadequate 
governance are not confined to outright violence. When it 
comes to water and sanitation, DINEPA is limited in not 
only its coffers, but also its capacity to sovereignly manage 
investments and sustain WASH facilities and programs. “We 
don’t have the freedom to self-direct our projects”, explained 
a DINEPA official who works in the Artibonite. The official 
added further, “We’re obliged to develop a project that can 
fit within a different program, otherwise we cannot do any-
thing”. Top-down direction, rather than accompaniment, from 
international funding partners overlooks not only the vital 
knowledge of local institutions but also the crucial role their 
strengthening plays in long-term sustainability.
The Organization for the Development of the Artibonite 
Valley (ODVA) – an autonomous body that was established 
under the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and 
Rural Development in 1949 and relies entirely on outside 
funding – is the government entity tasked with providing tech-
nical, administrative, and financial infrastructure for Haiti’s 
canal system. According to an official report of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Develop ment 
released in 2012, the irrigation network upon which hundreds 
of thousands of farmers rely has barely changed in the past 
20 years, besides the occasional rehabilitation project sup-
ported by international funding institutions.35 Like DINEPA, 
some of ODVA’s principal deficiencies include weaknesses 
in management, inadequate training, lack of financial sup-
port, and lack of coordination of internal actors as well 
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as international NGOs working in the field of agriculture. 
Projects that are implemented are significantly limited in 
scope and sustainability.
“Kanal la te kase”, the local Catholic priest observed 
solemnly on the morning of June 18, 2015. The situation was 
dire and the weight of his words hung in the air: a broken 
canal would put the 60,000 living in Bocozel at increased risk 
of losing this season’s rice crop, the consequences of which 
could be a death sentence. Years’ worth of trash and sediment 
had accumulated in the underground pipe bringing water from 
the Artibonite River to the canal before it streams through 
the irrigation network nourishing Haiti’s breadbasket. After 
a few recent heavy rains, the pipe had become completely 
clogged. There was barely a trickle in the concrete canal 
(constructed in the early 2000s) that reaches into Bocozel 
from the crossroads town of Pont Sondé.
Sediment washed down from bare mountains, plastic 
bags discarded in the open, empty soda bottles littering the 
sidewalks, and all kinds of rubbish gradually accumulated 
in the pipe. Unmitigated deforestation – a consequence of 
reliance on charcoal as the chief cooking fuel and weak 
governmental conservation policy, among a host of other 
factors – has precipitated environmental degradation and 
erosion. Inadequate municipal services means little to no 
regular trash collection in poor areas. Poor maintenance of 
irrigation systems and a failure to collect refuse, when linked 
to runaway deforestation, prevent farmers from irrigating 
their fields, which means that many lose their crop and fall 
deeper into poverty, crippling their access to highly privatized 
education, food, water, and health care. These issues lead to 
strong feelings by some community members. “We don’t 
have a government”, said an OAD farmer. He further added, 
“They’re like leeches, eating us and drinking our blood. 
The government considers us like trash they are just going 
to throw away”. For some, the trash that clogged the pipe 
in Pont Sondé brought into relief a metaphor for their own 
lives. The paucity of effective public systems that allows for 
infrastructural disasters, like the broken canal, perpetuates 
material insecurities and social-political ones as well.
Two weeks later, ODVA personnel were finally able 
to borrow an excavator machine from a nearby UN base. 
Although the major canal was functional again, many 
 secondary networks – especially further downstream – 
remained stagnant and overgrown with water weeds. Without 
adequate irrigation, the farmland supplied by these networks 
was extremely vulnerable to the draught that struck the region 
soon thereafter. No water means no rice paddies. And no rice 
means, among many other consequences, no money to buy 
safe drinking water, reinforcing the vicious cycle of poverty 
and illness: for example, according to one national study on 
the impact that the cholera epidemic had on food insecurity 
in 2011, the supply of labor in the Artibonite Valley and 
irrigated districts in the Central Plateau area fell nearly 30%, 
resulting in loss of 10%–15% of rice harvests.36
Consequences of flooded rice market
Even if farmers are able to produce a healthy crop, they face 
a market dominated by imported US rice to the point where 
92% of rice consumed in Haiti is from the USA.37 In 2013, the 
Artibonite Valley produced more than 70% of domestic rice. 
Yet, this production represented only 12% of rice consumed 
in the country.37 Decades of flooding the Haitian rice market 
with cheap (and highly subsidized) US rice have undermined 
domestic production, which has had devastating downstream 
effects on local health, thus  perpetuating a vicious cycle of sub-
sistence and poverty in an already vulnerable environment.
The history of the US domination of the Haitian rice 
market is a fairly brief one, as shown by interviews in Haiti. 
“The level of rice production that we used to have is much 
less now”, said the ODVA director. His statement is not only 
informed by his public position, but also by his personal 
experience. He also said, 
My dad was a rice farmer, growing rice all the time, and my 
mom was the one selling the rice. My father, my grandfather, 
and great grandfather – they all planted rice. 
Much has changed over the past generation.
In 1986, following the fall of the Duvalier regime, the 
US government began implementing structural adjustment 
policies that promoted privatization (private companies often 
meaning US-based ones), restricted Haitian government 
involvement,38 and reduced tariffs in imports, allowing US 
rice to flood the Haitian market. Rather than helping resolve 
Haiti’s rapidly accumulating debt and economic woes, this 
period of neoliberal restructuring devastated the domestic 
market, worsened the nation’s debt problems and trade defi-
cit,39 and crippled local rice production. By 1995, the World 
Food Program calculated Haiti’s food self-sufficiency ratio 
to be 50%, which is a decrease from 85% in 1980.40
Sacrificing self-sufficiency for food-security-through-
trade has adversely affected most Haitians: President Bill 
Clinton, who was appointed as UN Special Envoy to Haiti 
in 2009, publicly apologized in March 2010 for champi-
oning policies like drastic tariff reductions that destroyed 
Haiti’s rice production during the mid-1990s: “It may have 
been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has 
not worked. It was a mistake”, he told the Senate Foreign 
 Relations Committee.41
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Since 1986, Haiti’s rural poor have been bearing the 
brunt of wave upon wave of structural adjustment and liber-
alization at the hands of national leaders, foreign investors 
and organizations, and the private sector elite. “There’s no 
investment in the people in the Artibonite: there’s no water, 
fertilizer, seeds, or other things needed to grow rice”, Rafael, 
the coordinator of the Haitian OAD, explained. “So farmers 
can’t produce enough to feed the whole country. The worse 
thing is that now US rice is being sold in the Artibonite, too!” 
As of 2012, three of seven main national importers controlled 
70% of the rice market; all of them sourced their rice from 
the USA.37 While peasant farmers in Bocozel struggle to 
produce enough rice to survive, these businesses profit off 
of a lucrative importation system that has exacerbated food 
insecurity in the nation.
In 2014, Haiti’s Global Health Index score (which com-
bines indicators of undernourishment, underweight children, 
and child mortality) placed it 67th out of 120 countries 
included in the study.42 Also, the prospects for the year ahead 
are, under current circumstances, bleak. According to the 
Haiti National Coordination for Food Security (Coordination 
Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire [CNSA]), agricultural 
production from July to December 2015 was projected to 
be below 50% compared to a normal year due to consider-
able crop losses caused by drought and seed scarcity and 
compounded by inadequate irrigation infrastructure, rising 
food and fertilizer prices, and increasing inflation.43 A recent 
CNSA bulletin reports that 30% of the Haitian population 
is living in food insecurity, with limited access to enough 
affordable and nutritious food.43
The consequences of a flooded market, combined with 
ecological factors and institutional weaknesses, feed into the 
cycle of poverty and disease. “Everything that we’re able to 
do – paying for education, food, health care, or building latrines 
– depends on a person’s crop”, observed a woman in Dubuis-
son. According to data collected by a national survey in 2012, 
education level was inversely related to cholera incidence: the 
majority of cholera patients (86% out of 2,478) had only a 
primary education or less.23 Lacking resources for education 
increases one’s risk for cholera, which in turn undermines one’s 
productivity and income and perpetuates the cycle.
Poor farmers, like OAD members, in Bocozel and 
elsewhere in the Artibonite are advocating for a paradigm 
shift: donor policies, trade rules, and external involvement 
need to better respect national and community sovereignty, 
strengthen agricultural and water systems, and support small-
scale farmers who produce for local markets.44 Shifting the 
paradigm toward alleviating poverty and its effects among the 
destitute poor, in part by protecting and prioritizing domestic 
agricultural production, must be fundamental to a strategy 
targeting the elimination of cholera.
Existing at the margin of Haitian society – and almost 
entirely invisible and unheard in the global economy45 –  peasant 
rice farmers are made vulnerable to structural and environmental 
forces and exploitation. Without viable economic opportunities, 
social safety nets, food security, or municipal infrastructure, 
poor Haitians lack the means to access basic human rights like 
adequate nutrition, water, or sanitation.
What it might take to achieve 
elimination
The likelihood of Haiti achieving its elimination goals 
under the current status quo of economic and political 
disenfranchisement of the poor and peasant classes (urban 
and rural) is scant. While domestic production for both export 
and local consumption remains undermined by a market 
flooded with imports and a closed network of powerful 
merchants, the long-term impact of investments in WASH 
is  compromised. Sustained investment in health and sanita-
tion – and thus  disease eradication – is difficult to imagine 
without a strategy that addresses the fact that almost 60% of 
Haitians live on less than $2.44 a day.46
The hidden sickness of this poverty must also be brought 
into the open if the elimination plan is to succeed. New water 
supply and sanitation technology is a precarious investment 
if rice farmers do not have water or fertilizer to grow and 
earn a living from their small fields and paddies; the cost of 
education keeps families from affording other basic needs; 
imported US rice sells for half the price as local rice; the 
effects of climate change continue to disproportionately 
burden the poor;47 unsound roads make access to markets and 
health care a struggle; a defective land tenure system results 
in extortion and violence; only a quarter of the population 
has access to  electricity;48 and government agencies like 
DINEPA and ODVA remain grotesquely underfunded and 
unaccompanied, struggling to maintain vital staff on the 
job. Without integrating these and other crucial factors into 
a plan, millions of dollars risk being squandered, attempts at 
short- and long-term interventions will fade into artifacts of 
development, and, most importantly, those most vulnerable 
will suffer the consequences.
As the World Bank highlighted in its 2013 report, the pres-
sure on water resources, given the projected climate change, 
is expected to increase significantly in the coming years.47 
“DINEPA is trying to attract people’s attention, especially 
among the country’s leadership, to think about the future 
of water in Haiti”, said a regional staff member. “Let’s take 
erosion for example”, the official continued.
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When it rains, the water washes away the soil and doesn’t 
absorb into the earth where it can replenish springs. A lot of 
the time it’s because people cut down trees to make charcoal. 
And now DINEPA is finding that many springs are going dry 
because there are not enough trees. This means that the leaders 
in the Ministry of the Environment should also get involved. 
The public government should have certain laws to prevent 
people from cutting down trees, to have an alternative form of 
energy so that people don’t cut down the trees. This will help 
protect our soil and our water. [regional staff member]
Just as with water, the protection of health – and similarly, 
the elimination of cholera – must involve a multisectoral 
approach.
There remains some debate over whether it would be 
possible to eradicate cholera from Haiti, with most experts 
agreeing that elimination of infection is the goal, at least 
initially. Inherent in the definition of eradication in public 
health terms is the emphasis that continued measures to 
prevent infection would no longer be needed if eradica-
tion was achieved. However, eradication will not occur if 
transmission is still occurring. In some ways, an argument 
calling for eradication of cholera in Haiti (rather than “just” 
elimination of infection) is valuable, such that it calls on 
public health experts to raise their expectations of what is 
possible to accomplish.
Conclusion
Progress has been made in Haiti to reduce cholera morbidity 
and mortality, but cholera transmission, illness, and death 
continue to occur on a daily basis. Haiti’s National Plan for 
the Elimination of Cholera has proposed policies and inter-
ventions that incorporate short- and long-term  strategies for 
the improvement of the health and WASH sectors – from 
distributing water filters and water purification tablets to 
 vaccinating vulnerable communities, and from building 
public latrines and water systems to strengthening institutions 
like DINEPA. The success of the plan has and will continue to 
be limited not only by funding and other resource challenges, 
but also, intrinsically, by the unaddressed intersecting factors 
that, though hidden to many in positions of power within and 
outside of Haiti (particularly those with the means of effect-
ing and implementing policy change), are vital components 
of the realities that many Haitians face.
Structural vulnerabilities cut across all sectors – not just 
WASH, health care, and education, but agriculture, envi-
ronment, (global and local) commerce, transportation, and 
 governance as well. These are among the hidden sicknesses 
that impede Haiti and its partners’ capacity to eliminate cho-
lera from the country –they are likely to be neither unique to 
Haiti nor to the disease of cholera. These hidden sicknesses, 
along with the perspectives of the rural poor, must be laid bare 
and incorporated into systems-based and ecologically aware 
approaches to development in Haiti, and beyond. Over the 
coming years, the success and sustainability of Haiti’s plan to 
eliminate cholera will depend as much on adequate funding as 
it will on partnerships that use innovative strategies to tackle 
the accompanying etiologies and manifestations of poverty.
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